We now distinguish between two classes of pollutants, with the first and easiest class to control commonly referred to as uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants, and the second, and somewhat more complex class, being nonuniformly mixed assimilative pollutants. Assimilative pollutants are so termed because the capacity to absorb them is rather large; by uniformly mixed, it is meant that the ambient concentration depends on the total amount of emissions but not on the distribution of these emissions among the sources (cf. Tietenberg 1985) . Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are the archetypical uniformly mixed and, ultimately, assimilative pollutants. Volatile organic compounds are not uniformly mixed on a regional (multistate) scale, although on a smaller scale, such as within an airshed like the Los Angeles basin, they may be approximated as such. Indeed, on a multistate scale, no traditional pollutant is well mixed; but on a local scale, such an approximation may be appropriate. In this paper we consider a large regionas in the case of power utilities, for example-and hence nonuniformity is a reasonable assumption.
For uniformly mixed pollutants (cf. Tietenberg 1985), a cost-effective solution may be achieved by the EPS approach, which allows for unit-for-unit trades among any sources in the airshed for example, in the case of air pollution. However, for nonuniformly mixed assimilative pollutants, an APS approach rather than an EPS approach may be preferable. Nevertheless, in an APS approach a pollution dispersion matrix is required, and dispersion modeling in itself is not a trivial task. Air pollution dispersion matrices, however, are not unique to APS permit systems because dispersion models were already in use by the / 425
Environmental Protection Agency prior to the implementation of permit systems (cf. Tietenberg 1985) . For additional background, we refer the reader to such standard texts on environmental economics as Tietenberg (1988) , Pearce and Turner (1990) , and Kahn (1998) .
Another approach to curb pollution in a region is the approach whereby polluters are charged a fixed price for each unit of pollution (cf. Montgomery 1972) . If the same price is charged for pollution on all firms, then the marginal costs of abatement are equated across firms, and the resulting level of pollution can be reached in a cost-minimizing manner. Yet another approach is to have polluting firms pay a price equal to the marginal external cost of their polluting activities. These price incentives, in the form of Pigouvian taxes (cf. Pigou 1920), would lead to corrective behavior on the part of the polluting firms by inducing them to internalize the full social costs of pollution. One may also use an approach discussed in Nagurney et al. (1996) , in which targets are imposed on the economic variables (which in their case were supply, demand, and transportation targets) with associated penalties for failure to comply and with the taxes set accordingly. That approach utilized a generalization of goal programming through the use of variational inequalities.
In this paper we model multiproduct, multipollutant oligopolistic firms engaged in markets in ambient-based pollution permits. Besides facing production costs and emission costs, the firms also face transaction costs associated with the trade of permits, in addition to the price of purchasing licenses in excess of the initial allocations in order to fulfill the allowance of emissions.
More theoretical environmental policy analyses focus on developing policy instruments under the assumption that firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets. However, modern industrial markets may not satisfy the conditions for perfect competition, where it is assumed that there are many producers, each of which cannot affect the price of the product that they produce and takes the price as given; they might be better characterized as having an oligopolistic structure. In recent years, there has been an increasing theoretical interest in modeling oligopolies in the context of environmental policy-making (see, for example, Hahn 1984 , Carraro et al. 1996 , and Van Egteren and Weber 1996). Hence, in this paper we focus on oligopolistic, rather than on perfectly competitive, firms.
We assume that the firms are perfectly competitive in the permit markets. More specifically, each source of pollution takes the price of the license to pollute a particular pollutant at a certain point as given, because each source in a region is small relative to the entire economy. The model also deals explicitly with spatial differentiation through the use of a diffusion matrix that maps emissions from sources to receptor points that are dispersed in space. This is especially important because studies show that if spatial differentiation is not built into the system, then some or most of the cost savings from employing an economic-based approach can be lost (cf. Mendelsohn 1986). Nevertheless, Bohi and Burtraw (1997) showed that considerable cost savings were achieved under an EPS-based system for the U.S. SO2 emissions. A main reason for those cost savings was the flexibility allowed electric utilities to switch to lower sulphur content coal. Under that program, some utilities mitigated the emission levels rather than engaging in trading of permits, but this is an advantage afforded by economic incentive systems, whereby the overall goal of emission reduction is attained.
Furthermore, it is clear that policy instruments must be analyzed within the context of the market structure. Here we provide a modeling and, in particular, computational framework to allow for such analyses in the case of oligopolistic firms and perfectly competitive permit markets in the presence of transaction costs. The case of perfectly competitive firms and permit markets can also be handled within the variational inequality framework as discussed in Nagurney and Dhanda (1996) and extended to include transaction costs using the modeling approach presented here.
We focus on transaction costs in this paper because they can obstruct the performance efficiency of the permit market by impeding the trading process of permits. This is especially important in the case of the APS approach that we model in this paper. For example, the information requirements needed in order to derive the pollution dispersion/diffusion matrix may raise the transaction costs in the trading process. In general terms, transaction costs can arise in any market and usually result from the transfer of any property right, because the parties to an exchange must find one another, communicate, and exchange information (cf. Stavins 1995). Empirical evidence also suggests the prevalence of transaction costs. The Fox River water pollutant trading program did not perform up to the expectations, largely because of high transaction costs in the form of administrative requirements. On the other hand, when these administrative requirements were minimal, a high level of trade took place in lead-rights trading among refineries, a program that was a part of the Environmental Protection Agency's leaded gasoline phasedown in the United States. The refineries were already experienced at striking deals with one another and, hence, the firms did not have to engage in broker fees to find trading partners (cf. Hahn and Hester 1989). In another case, the New Jersey Pinelands transferable development rights program, the transaction cost were minimized by the government body taking on a feeless brokerage role (cf. Tripp and Dudeck 1989).
The mathematical framework chosen for the formulation, qualitative analysis, and computation of the equilibrium pattern in markets for pollution control in the presence of transaction costs is that of finite-dimensional variational inequality theory. Thus far, variational inequality theory has been used in environmental economic policy modeling in the context of ambient-based pollution permit markets in oligopolistic markets but only in the case of single-product, single-pollutant oligopolistic firms and in the absence of transaction costs (cf. Nagurney and Dhanda 1996). Hence, this paper extends the earlier work to a more general setting. Moreover, we emphasize that to date 426 / NAGURNEY AND DHANDA no general computational procedure or model has been developed to handle transaction costs in such a setting. The only prior work was that of Stavins ( 1995) , who provided no computational procedure and whose model was very simple.
Our model applies the theory of variational inequalities to yield the profit-maximized quantities of multiple products, the optimal quantities of various emissions, the equilibrium allocation of the pollution licenses, and the prices of the licenses, all in the presence of transaction costs. We aim to make a contribution in the direction of environmental economics since the use of variational inequality theory to this field has yet to be fully explored. For a plethora of additional equilibrium problems in both operations research and in economics that have been studied as variational inequality problems, see Nagurney (1993) .
The paper is organized as follows. In ?1, we develop the optimization problem faced by an individual firm in the presence of transaction costs. Subsequently, we present the economic conditions governing the market model and then derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions. In addition, we also provide the qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern. In ?2, we propose an algorithm for the computation of the equilibrium pattern and provide conditions for convergence. This algorithm yields variational inequality subproblems of very simple structure, each of which can be solved explicitly and in closed form. This algorithm is then applied to compute solutions to several numerical examples in ?3. We summarize our results and present conclusions in ?4.
THE MULTIPRODUCT, MULTIPOLLUTANT OLIGOPOLY MODEL WITH AMBIENT-BASED POLLUTION PERMITS AND TRANSACTION COSTS
In this section, we develop the multiproduct, multipollutant oligopolistic market model with ambient-based pollution permits and transaction costs. As mentioned, transaction costs can emerge in the construction of a market in pollution permits because the firms, to trade licenses to pollute, must find one another, must communicate, and must exchange information. We consider m firms that are sources of industrial pollution in the region, and which are fixed in location, with a typical source or firm denoted by i. There are n receptor points, with a typical receptor point denoted by j. Also, let there be r different pollutants emitted by the firms, with a typical pollutant denoted by t. Let et denote the amount of pollutant t emitted by firm i and group the firm's emissions into a vector ej E R+. We assume, as given, an r x m x n diffusion matrix H, where the component h{, denotes the contribution that one unit of emission by source i makes to average pollutant concentration of type t at receptor point j (cf. Montgomery 1972) .
Let a permit denote a license, the possession of which will allow a source to pollute a specific pollutant at some specific receptor point. Hence, each polluter will have to hold a portfolio of licenses to cover all the relevant monitored receptor points. Let IP denote the number of licenses for pollutant t at point j held by source i, and group the licenses for each firm i into a vector 1i E R?'. We assume throughout that some initial allocation of licenses ito, ,i= l...,m; j=I,...,n; tz 1,...,r has been made by the regulatory agency and, later in this section, discuss how this allocation should be made in order to ensure that environmental quality standards are met.
Furthermore, let t denote the price of the licenses for pollutant t that affects receptor point ], and group the prices of the licenses into the vector p e R'. Also, assume that the market in pollution licenses is perfectly competitive; that is, each source of pollution takes the price of the license to pollute at a specific point as given and cannot affect the price itself because each source is small relative to the entire economy. The license trading system, as an economic-incentive approach, designs license markets in order to achieve environmental goals in a cost-effective manner. The effectiveness, therefore depends upon perfect competition in the permit market, and regulators should design policy instruments that would guarantee perfect competition in permit trading. Indeed, unlike the firms' production outputs, the supply of initial licenses is fixed and determined so that the environmental goals are achieved. The "market" power, in this sense, is entirely dependent on the initial license allocation and controlled by the regulatory agency.
Let there be s distinct products that are produced by the firms in a noncooperative manner, with a typical output denoted by d and the quantity of product d produced by firm i denoted by qid. These quantities are first grouped into the vector q e Rms. We assume that each product is homogeneous; that is, the consumers are indifferent as to which firm was the producer.
The underlying idea behind the market in pollution permits is that the firms or sources of pollutants must be encouraged to trade permits. A typical firm participating in a permit market, however, has to take into account various costs, such as those of production, emission abatement, purchasing pollution licenses, and finally, the transaction costs involved in the trade of these licenses.
Each firm i in the oligopoly is faced with a cost fi of producing the vector of quantities qi, where fi = fi(qi)-Each firm i in the region is also faced with a joint-cost gi, which is dependent both upon the product vector qi and the emission vector ei, where gi =gi(ei,qJ).
(2)
In addition, a firm encounters transaction costs to be able to participate in the permit market to trade pollution licenses. Specifically, let ct denote the total transaction cost that a firm i incurs to trade pollution permits for pollutant t at receptor point j in the market, where Ctj = Ctj( Its ).
~~~~~~(3 ) / 427
Hence, we assume that the transaction cost for the purchase or sale of a license to pollute a particular pollutant at a specific receptor point depends upon the number of licenses for that particular pollutant and that receptor point held by the firm.
Because we assume that the firms are oligopolistic in their product markets, they affect the prices of the outputs. Hence, if we denote the price of a product d by Pd In other words, the rationality postulate here is that each firm selects its production outputs, its emissions, and its licenses, so that its profit is maximized, given the production output vector decisions of the other oligopolistic firms. Note that here we consider a Cournot oligopoly, rather than a Bertrand oligopoly, in which firms select the prices of their products. For background on Bertrand oligopolies, see Tirole (1988) and the references therein. An increasing number of energy market models (e.g., Oren 1997) are based upon a supply function conjecture, where each firm believes that other firms will not change their supply function (price vs. quantity). We have selected a Cournot oligopoly rather than a Bertrand or supply function oligopoly in order to be consistent with the firm's variables which are all quantity variables in particular, the amounts to producethe amounts of pollutants to emit as well as the number of licenses to purchase. We leave the modeling of Bertrand oligopolies and ambient-based pollution permits for future research.
DEFINITION 1 (NASH-COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM

Optimality Conditions for a Firm
If we assume that the profit function, ui(q, ei, ii), for each firm i is concave with respect to its arguments and is continuously differentiable, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal firm-specific product, emission, license, and marginal abatement cost pattern, (q>* e7*, /7, 27 ), given The system (13) states that if the price of a license for pollutant t at a point j is positive, then in equilibrium the market for licenses at that point must clear; if there is an excess supply of licenses for a particular pollutant t at a receptor point, then the price of a license at that point must be zero.
We first give the governing equilibrium conditions for the entire problem and then derive the variational inequality formulation, which is a unified framework within which all the inequalities and equalities can be expressed as a single inequality.
DEFINITION 2 (MARKET EQUILIBRIUM)
. A vector of production outputs, emissions, licenses, associated marginal costs of abatement, and license prices, (q*, e*, 1*,A*, p*) E Rms+mr+2rmn+nr, is an equilibrium of the multiproduct, multipollutant oligopoly with ambient-based pollution permits developed above if and only if it satisfies inequality ( 12) for all firms i; i = 1, . . ., m, and the system of equalities and inequalities ( 13 ) for all receptor points: j; j = 1,..., n, and for all pollutants: t; t = 1, . . ., r.
We now derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions for the market model. Variational inequality (14) can now be expressed as
THEOREM 1 (VARIATIONAL INEQUALITY FORMULATION
We now put variational inequality (14) into standard form (cf. Nagurney 1993). Define the column vector X -(q, e, i, X, p) E RKms+mr+2rmn+rn and F(X) as the row vector consisting of the row vectors (G(X),E(X),L(X), A(X),P(X)), where G(X) is the ms-dimensional vector
F(X*).(X-X*))O, VXEK,
where K {X =(q, e, 1, , p) E Rs+mr+2rmn+rn} and . denotes the inner product in the Euclidean space RN. Note that in the case of perfectly competitive firms, the governing variational inequality would be as in (14), with the term aPd( *q~d) in (14) replaced by PdNote that the variational inequality (14) provides a formulation of the equilibrium conditions that consist of both equalities and inequalities, and one does not know a priori which equilibrium variables will have positive values. Moreover, it provides a concise formulation, consisting of a single inequality. In addition, numerous equilibrium problems in both economics and in operations research have now been formulated and studied as variational inequality problems (cf. Nagurney 1993 and the references therein).
In the next corollary we prove that the equilibrium pattern is independent of the initial license allocation, provided that the sum of licenses for each pollutant and each receptor point is fixed. We then provide what those sums should be equal to in order to guarantee that the imposed environmental quality standards are met. In particular, let QJ denote the imposed environmental standard for receptor point j and pollutant t. 
COROLLARY 1 (INDEPENDENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM PATTERN FROM INITIAL LICENSE ALLOCATION
under the assumption that the profitfunctions have bounded second-order derivatives.
PROOF. See the appendix.
DEFINITION 3 (COERCIVE FUNCTION). A function F(X), from a feasible set K to RN, is said to be coercive if (F(X)-F(X')) . (X-Xl
as I X I-oc, for X e K, and for some X1 e K.
We now state the existence result. 
THE ALGORITHM
In this section we present an algorithm for the solution of variational inequality ( 14) governing the market equilibrium model for pollution permits. The algorithm resolves the variational inequality problem into very simple subproblems, each of which can be solved explicitly and in closed form.
The algorithm we propose for the computation of the equilibrium pattern is the modified projection method for Korpelevich (1976) . The algorithm is guaranteed to converge, provided that F satisfies only the monotonicity condition and the Lipschitz continuity condition, assuming that a solution exists. The algorithm has been applied by Nagurney and Dhanda (1996) previously to compute the equilibrium pattern in single-pollutant, single-product oligopolistic and perfectly competitive market equilibrium problems with ambient-based permits, but without transaction costs. It has also been applied to compute the equilibrium pattern in spatial markets with ad valorem tariffs (cf. Nagurney et al. 1996) , as well as the equilibrium pattern in a variety of financial problems (cf. Nagurney and Siokos 1997).
The statement of the modified projection method is as follows.
Step 0: Initialization. Set X0 E K. Let Y7= 1 and let x be a scalar such that 0 < oc < L-' where L is the Lipschitz continuity constant (cf. (17)).
Step 1: Computation. Compute X by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
[X T+ x(-1)T _ X9_-I]T. [X XS
for all Xe K.
Step 2: Adaptation. Compute X7 by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
O.
Step 3 
Because the feasible set here is of box type, the above projections immediately decompose across the coordinates of the feasible set. In fact, the solution of each of the variables encountered in (22) 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we present numerical examples illustrating the model presented in ? 1, along with the performance of the algorithm of ?2. The data access information is presented in tables in the appendix. We present three oligopoly examples of increasing complexity, and then for each of these examples we subsequently increase and then decrease the transaction costs to evaluate the effect on the trades of licenses.
We assume that each firm faces a production cost function of the form The convergence tolerance E was set to 0.0001, and the parameter a was set to 0.1 in the algorithm for all the examples. We also computed the maximum error for this convergence tolerance and the average error, where the error was defined as the absolute value of the respective left-hand-side term in the variational inequality (14) for each variable that had a computed positive value. Note that this value should be as close to zero as possible.
The algorithm was coded in FORTRAN 77. The system used was the IBM SP2 at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
In addition, to measure the effect of changes in the transaction costs on the trade of licenses, we defined the volume of trade measure A\ as follows: We then perturbed the transaction cost data by increasing the transaction costs by multiplying the 0 1 ij, parameter by 5 for all ijt. For brevity, we do not report the new equilibrium pattern but note that the equilibrium prices for licenses affecting receptor point 1 and receptor point 2 dropped to the new prices as reported at the bottom of Table 2 . The volume of trade A now decreased to 4.937. Hence, the transaction costs, as expected, had a negative effect on the trades that took place. We then decreased the original 0 l ij terms by a factor of 5 for all i, j, t and obtained the new computed A = 11.92. Such a decrease in transaction costs resulted in an increase in the trade volume. EXAMPLE 2. To evaluate the effect of the number of firms on the equilibrium pattern, we increased the number of firms from two to three in the second example. The three firms in the oligopoly produce two products and emit two pollutants that affect two receptor points. Refer to Table 3 in the appendix for the input data for this example.
The algorithm required 1,414 iterations for convergence to the equilibrium output vectors reported in Table 4 in the appendix. Note that in this example, as in Example 1, the markets in licenses for each pollutant and receptor point also cleared and, hence, the prices were positive. In this example, A = 17.568, with the maximum error equal to 0.00018 and the average error equal to 0.001.
We subsequently increased the transaction costs in the same manner as in Example 1 by multiplying the coefficient b 1 ijt by 5 for all ijt. As expected, A then decreased to 13.385, reflecting that transaction costs are a barrier to trade. The equilibrium prices for the licenses also dropped.
Finally, we decreased the transaction cost terms in the identical manner as Example 1 and the new computed A = 19.325, providing further evidence that transaction costs act as a barrier to trade. EXAMPLE 3. In the third example, we increased the number of receptor points from two to three and the three firms in the oligopoly still produce two products and emit two pollutants, as in Examples 1 and 2. Refer to Table 5 in the appendix for the input data for this example.
The modified projection method converged in 1,718 iterations and yielded the equilibrium vectors reported in Table 6 in the appendix. The maximum and average errors were, respectively, 0.00094 and 0.00017. In Example 3, the markets in licenses for each pollutant and receptor point cleared and the prices were positive. In this example, the value of A is 28.234. We note that the equilibrium quantity vector remains the same as in the previous example indicating that a change in the number of receptor points does not directly impact the quantities a firm produces, at least in this particular example.
We next increased the transaction costs as we had in the preceding two examples by multiplying the coefficient 0 1 ijt by 5 for all ijt, with the consequence that the volume of trade measure A then decreased to 23.869. In addition, the prices of the licenses dropped, reflecting the decrease in the volume of licenses traded.
As in Examples 1 and 2, we then decreased the transaction costs by dividing the original 0 1 ijt values by 5 for all i, j, t. As expected, the volume of trade increased, with the new A = 29.775.
These examples illustrate the effect of certain parameters, such as changes in transaction costs, on the volume of licenses traded. Specifically, we note that in these examples an increase in transaction costs leads to a decrease in the volume of licenses traded, whereas a decrease leads to an increase in the volume of licenses traded.
The above numerical examples highlight the variety of multiproduct, multipollutant oligopoly problems with marketable pollution permits that can be solved. Although the algorithm requires a large number of iterations for convergence, each iteration of the algorithm is remarkably simple and computationally very efficient because closed-form expressions are used. Indeed, each of the above examples was solved in a negligible amount of CPU time-less than 0.001 CPU seconds. Moreover, the computed solutions are very accurate. The algorithm appears suitable for the evaluation of alternative transaction cost scenarios.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a variational inequality framework for the formulation, qualitative analysis, and computation of equilibria in multiproduct, multipollutant oligopolistic markets with marketable pollution permits and in the presence of transaction costs. The model explicitly handles spatial differentiation for the pollutants as well as the transfers between firms that take place.
The model significantly extends those that have been presented in the literature todate. Moreover, we proposed an algorithm, along with convergence results, that resolves what we expect to be large-scale problems into very simple subproblems, which can then be solved in closed form. Finally, to illustrate both the model and the algorithm, we presented numerical results.
Additional research in the future will include empirical analysis, as well as the incorporation of dynamics into the modeling scheme.
